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This article focuses on legal reasoning and legal epist mology within the African 
context. It examines the system of legal justice in post-colonial Africa and submits 
that because of the colonial legacy, post-colonial African legal reasoning is 
methodologically founded on empiricism and positivism. It avers that despite its merit 
of scientific objectivity, such legal reasoning is largely incapable of addressing 
offences committed through the manipulation of metaphysical realities or other forms 
of covert criminalities and wrongdoing. Consequently, he article proposes that the 
methodology of African metaphysical epistemology be adopted to complement the 
colonial methodology of legal reasoning in Africa, as it has the advantageous result of 
helping in the search for truth concerning such offences, thereby promoting the 
delivery of effective legal justice, and thus contributing significantly to the 
development of a balanced and reliable justice system in contemporary African 
societies. The methods of critical analysis, reflectiv  argumentation and oral interview 
were adopted to pursue the goals of the study. 
 
Keywords 




Epistemology: a branch of philosophy which focuses on a critical and systematic 
investigation of the nature, sources and quality of knowledge. It is also referred to as 
the theory of knowledge. 
  
Metaphysics: a branch of philosophy which focuses on a critical and systematic study 
of the nature and basic principles of reality. 
 
African metaphysical epistemology: a sub-branch of African philosophy which 
focuses on the spiritual modes of knowing empirically hidden facts about the present 
or the future world. 
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Empiricism: an epistemic theory which emphasizes that e ultimate source of human 
knowledge is the sense experience of the human person. Some of the well known 
empiricists in Western philosophy are Aristotle, John Locke, David Hume and George 
Berkeley. The opposite epistemic theory is rationalism, which emphasizes that the 
ultimate source of human knowledge is human reason. S me of the well known 
rationalists in Western philosophy are Plato, Rene Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, and 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. 
 
Positivism: a position in the philosophy of science which holds that it is only an 
empirically (a scientifically) verifiable entity that should be recognized as knowable 
or properly constituting an existent. As a legal variant of this position, legal positivism 
claims that laws or legal rules are only (or should only be) validly drawn from a social 
fact - a socially constituted authority, such as the legislature, or any other body or 
institution that has been relevantly empowered to make law-like rules in society. 
 
Ontology: a sub-branch of metaphysics (see above) which focuses on a philosophical 
study of the nature and qualities of being or what is. 
 
Cosmology: a sub-branch of metaphysics (see above) which focuses on an 
investigation of the origin and nature (or totality) of the universe (all that exists). The 
term is also used to refer to a philosophical study of the totality of the world-view or 
system of beliefs of a people (as distinguished from that of another group of people). 
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Introduction  
There is good reason to argue that in order to establi h and sustain good governance 
and a stable society on the whole, a state needs a balanced and efficient justice 
system. Perhaps a fundamental aspect of a system of legal justice, apart from the 
requisite institutions and personnel, is the legal re soning, roughly taken to be the 
reasoning process employed by the actors involved in the dispensing of legal justice. 
For a very long time, the Western mode of legal reasoning has been founded on what 
one could reasonably call the principles of empiricism and positivism. This roughly 
means that before a valid legal pronouncement is made on any criminal legal issue, 
for example, between X and Y, at least two principles must be followed. First, there 
should be a physically demonstrable causal connection between the injury suffered by 
the victim and the action of the offender (the empiricist angle). Second, the law being 
applied should be ostensibly spelt out in a known document and laid out by a known 
sovereign. In any contemporary society, the sovereign may be regarded as a 
constitutionally constituted authority charged with the responsibility of law-making 
(the legislature); judges’ pronouncements in celebrated cases decided in the past 
(stare decisis), and so on (the positivist angle). This legal reasoning has been extended 
to other non-Western regions of the world through Western colonisation. 
 
The Western mode of legal reasoning has been dominant within the system of legal 
justice in post-colonial Africa because of its colonial past.  However, this article 
argues that this mode of legal reasoning has been largely ineffective in dealing with 
metaphysically induced criminalities and other forms of covert wrongdoing that are 
now rampant in contemporary African society. Consequently, the article recommends 
that in order to enhance truth finding about metaphysically induced criminalities and 
other forms of covert wrongdoing, the methodology of African metaphysical 
epistemology be adopted to complement the Western mode of legal reasoning before 
legal justice is dispensed. It is only then that post-colonial African societies could 
boast of effective and balanced legal justice system , systems that duly recognise the 
peculiarities that follow from the commitment to the thinking of duality of reality 
which permeates African cosmology and ontology. 
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The article is divided into six sections. Section I i troduces the discussion; Section II 
undertakes some preliminary conceptual clarifications; Section III examines the 
historical background to the empiricist and positivis  basis of the dominant legal 
reasoning in the post-colonial African state;  Section IV discusses the shortcomings of 
the dominant legal reasoning in post-colonial Africa; Section V suggests a way to 
circumvent the weaknesses of the dominant legal reasoning in post-colonial Africa 
through the adoption of the methodology of African metaphysical epistemology; 
Section VI is a summary and conclusion. 
 
II. Preliminary Conceptual Clarifications 
We consider it apposite to start the present work with a good understanding of two 
principal concepts, namely, legal reasoning and African metaphysical epistemology. 
 
(a) Legal reasoning 
According to Harris (1997, 211,212), the concept of legal reasoning lends itself to 
diverse interpretations, depending on who the interpreter is. For solicitors and 
barristers, legal reasoning is all about prediction; advocates take it to be concerned 
with persuasion; judges ostensibly regard it as all about justification; legal text writers 
may engage in it as prediction and persuasion. Despite his presentation of the 
divergent views, Harris still admits that most write s usually assume the object of 
legal reasoning to be justification in the familiar sense of supporting the right answer, 
that is, providing reasons to show that a course of action is legally supported or why it 
ought to be legally supported (Harris 1997, 212). In addition, Harris himself proceeds 
from the assumption that justification is the primary function of legal reasoning upon 
which prediction and persuasion are parasitic (Harris 1997, 212). Furthermore, a look 
at the nature of the institution of law in the scientific-oriented Western world should 
convince us that the institution is usually understood in the empiricist and positivist 
sense. Thus, reasons offered in support of a course of action in law are also founded 
on this empiricist and positivist tradition. 
 
In the present article, legal reasoning is to be employed in a specific sense and within 
the confines of criminal justice. In this contextually specific sense, legal reasoning is 
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understood to be a cognitive process of moving from the level of the so-called 
physical evidence (however this is interpreted) to the level of affirmation of a person 
as a crime suspect (in the case of police arrest, dtention and prosecution), and/or a 
cognitive process of moving from the level of the so-called physical evidence (again 
however this is interpreted) to the level of  pronou cement of a judgment in a law 
court (in the case of the judge) - a judgment that is claimed to have been derived from 
the interrogation of the physical evidence advanced in the dispensation of legal 
justice. Thus understood, legal reasoning is partly logical and partly epistemic. It is 
logical in the sense that it is a sub-set of coherent asoning (logic being all about 
reasoning, inductive or deductive). It is inductive when it applies the fact(s) of past 
decided cases to the present case; it is deductive when it applies general legal rules to 
the present case. It is epistemic in the sense that it is a deliberate exercise in error-
avoiding in the systematic process of truth-seeking in the dispensation of legal justice, 
truth being one of the features of the traditional Western account of knowledge, from 
the era of Plato. 
 
(b) African metaphysical epistemology 
As a phrase, African metaphysical epistemology is a lexical conjugation of 
metaphysics and epistemology within the broad fold f African philosophy. 
Contextually, African metaphysical epistemology refe s to specific methodologies of 
truth-seeking (or knowledge-acquisition) that are widely employed in traditional 
African societies. The objects of these methodologies are trans-empirical or extra-
sensible reality and other forms of covert, though sensible, reality. 
 
III. Philosophical Historiography of the Colonial Legal Reasoning in 
the Post-Colonial African State 
The development of the dominant empiricist and positivi t mode of legal reasoning in 
Africa could be traced to both remote and immediate sources. The remote source is 
connected to the emergence of the Comtean positivism as well as the command theory 
of law founded by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and popularized by his disciple, John 
Austin (1790-1859). The immediate cause of empiricism and positivism in the 
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dominant legal reasoning in post-colonial Africa is located in its colonial past. The 
two events are briefly examined below. 
 
(a) Comtean Positivism and Legal Positivism 
Comtean positivism, otherwise called social positivi m, is attributed to the French 
sociologist and philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who developed what he 
referred to as “a science of society”, now commonly referred to as “sociology”, built 
upon a scientifically oriented philosophy, positive philosophy or positivism (Stumpf 
1994, 356). Specifically, Comte came up with the law of the three stages to account 
for the development of the human explanations of natural phenomena in their 
environment. For Comte (2000, 27), “each branch of our knowledge passes 
successfully through three theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the 
Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or psitive.” He explains further: 
In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of 
beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose of) all effects, 
- in short, Absolute knowledge - supposes all phenomena to be 
produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings. In the 
metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind 
supposes, instead of supernatural things, abstract for es, veritable 
entities (that is, personified abstractions), inherent in all beings, and 
capable of producing all phenomena. What is called th  explanation of 
phenomena is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper 
entity … In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the 
vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the 
universe, … and applies itself to the study of their laws, - that is, their 
invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and 
observation, duly combined, are the means of this knowledge (Comte 
2000, 28). 
 
To argue for the superiority of the last stage in relation to the first and second, Comte 
(2000, 29) maintains that “All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon’s time, that 
there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts.”  Stated 
differently, Comte holds that the highest and most advanced form of knowledge is 
that derived from, and confirmed by, human observation, but not by any theological 
or metaphysical speculation. 
 
It was this scientism of Comte that also extended to the realm of legal theory and 
practice in Western societies, and this engendered th  whole idea of legal positivism. 
18 Ronald Olufemi Badru and Tayo Raymond Eegunlusi 
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to precisely conceptualise legal positivism. Waluchow 
graphically notes the difficulty involved as follows: 
Despite its profound influence on the development of legal theory and 
(arguably) legal practice, and despite the considerabl  efforts of some 
theorists to undermine that influence, controversy and confusion 
abound concerning just what it is that legal positivi s are supposed to 
be saying (Waluchow 1998, 2). 
Similarly, Greenawalt (1996, 19) states that legal positivism as a label is more of a 
rhetorical force, since it does not genuinely clarify serious positions. According to 
him, theorists should endeavour to carefully explain just how they are using the label. 
 
Perhaps a starting point towards understanding what leg l positivism is all about, at 
least for the purposes of this article, is to grasp what positivism itself is. Raymond 
Wacks (2006, 18) explains that “The term ‘positivism’ derives from the Latin 
positum, which refers to the law as it is laid down or posited.” He states further that 
“the core of legal positivism is the view that the validity of any law can be traced to 
an objectively verifiable source” (Wacks 2006, 18). Thus one could say that 
positivism essentially emphasizes empiricism, secularity and sociality. Derivatively, 
one could attempt to define legal positivism as expr ssive of at least two things, 
namely, (1) that law creation and annulment are, and should be, acts of specific 
human beings in society (the thesis of sociality, or s ciety-responsiveness), and (2) 
that law, therefore, is independent of, and separate from, morality and similar 
normative systems of theology and metaphysics (the thesis of separability, or non-
moral responsiveness). One popular version of this positivist approach to legal theory 
is the command theory of law, which has been largely dominated by the thinking of 
classical legal philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. According to Bentham, 
a law may be defined as follows: 
An assemblage of signs declarative of a volition coceived or adopted 
by the sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to be observed in a 
certain case by a person or class of persons, who in the case in question 
are or are supposed to be subject to his power; such volition trusting 
for its accomplishment to the expectation of certain events which it is 
intended such declaration should, upon occasion, be a means of 
bringing to  pass, and the prospect of which it is intended such acts as a 
motive upon those whose conduct is in question (Bentham 1970, 1). 
In this conception of law, at least three features stand out: (1) law is strictly the 
imperative of the sovereign; (2) the sovereign is empirically or socially determinate; 
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(3) there should be obedience to the imperative of the empirically or socially 
determinate sovereign by a person whose conduct is regulated by the imperative. 
 
John Austin (1954), a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, also has a similar thinking about 
the nature of law: 
Positive laws, or laws strictly so called, are established directly or 
immediately by authors of three kinds:-by monarchs, or sovereign 
bodies, as supreme political superiors: by men in a state of subjection, 
as subordinate political superiors: by subjects, as private persons, in 
pursuance of legal rights. But every positive law, or every law strictly 
so called, is a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign 
number … to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author 
(Austin 1954, 134). 
 
A careful consideration shows that the conception of law by Austin also replicates the  
features inferred earlier from Bentham’s reading of the nature of law as the 
sovereign’s imperative, the definitive status of the sovereign in a state, and the 
required obedience of the subject of the sovereign to his imperative. It is noteworthy 
that the emphasis which the command theory of law places on the sovereign as law-
giver derived much from the classical work of Thomas Hobbes who formulated the 
Social Contract theory, in which the sovereign - the leviathan - is given more 
substantive powers than the people in a civil society, in order to be able to properly 
regulate the conduct of people so that there is no regress to the state of nature (see 
Hobbes 1968; Hobbes cited in Wolff 1996, 8-18). David Lyons (1984) graphically 
summarizes the basic claims of the sociality thesis and the separability thesis together 
thus: 
To determine what the law is we must engage in an empirical inquiry 
about the relevant facts … Social facts determine what laws exist and 
what they require and follow. These are a matter of objective fact. But 
moral judgments have no basis in fact; they simply express the 
attitudes that we have. So, it is impossible for law to be a function of 
morality. The identification and interpretation of law must be 
independent of moral conditions (Lyons 1984, 63-64). 
 
The classical reading of legal positivism, as exemplified by the sociality thesis and the 
separability thesis, is still reflected in the positivist legal theory of contemporary 
times. According to Raymond Wacks, modern legal positivists usually adopt a 
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considerably more sophisticated approach to the concept of law. Wacks claims that 
like their distinguished predecessors, the modern lgal positivists also deny the 
relationship proposed by natural law between law and morals. He states that the claim 
of natural lawyers that law consists of a series of pr positions derived from nature 
through a process of reasoning is strongly contested by legal positivists. Wacks 
further notes that legal positivists also often claim that there is no necessary 
connection between law and morals, and that the highest common factor among legal 
positivists is that the law as laid down should be kept separate - for the purpose of 
study and analysis - from the law as it ought morally to be (see Wacks 2006, 18, 18-
19, 19). 
 
In sum, for Wacks (2006, 18), the core of legal positivi m is the view that the validity 
of any law can be traced to an objectively verifiable source. Furthermore, Julie 
Dickson (2012, 50) concurs that contemporary legal positivists are committed to the 
social thesis: they hold that the existence and content of the law is ultimately to be 
determined by reference to social facts. 
 
The foregoing thinking, to reiterate, has played a fundamental role in legal theory and 
practice in the West as well as in the regions that have been colonised by the West. 
 
(b) Legal Positivism and Colonisation in Africa 
One of the legacies of colonial rule in Africa was the evolution of the empiricism and 
positivism in the legal theory and practice in the continent. As with other impositions 
from the colonialists, some justificatory argument was also offered to support the 
introduction of the spirit of legal positivism in Africa. 
 
According to Idowu (2006, 34-49), the sceptical argument and the absence thesis have 
been employed by the colonialists to justify their imposition of legal positivism on 
Africans. For him “the sceptical frame in the views of the authors consists in the fact 
that Africans lack a conceptual and vividly correct analysis of the concepts of law” 
(Idowu 2006, 37). Idowu explicitly states the sceptist position further: 
Significantly, the impact of this argument has been pushed further in 
the view that even if Africans had indigenous system of social control, 
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it lacked substantially, any trace of legality, legal concepts and legal 
elements (Idowu 2006, 37). 
Thus what the indigenous Africans allegedly lacked the colonialists had to provide. 
 
For Idowu (2006, 37), the absence thesis is the idea that African jurisprudence does 
not exist in as much as there is the absence of written records. One could rationally 
state that the composite of the sceptist argument and the absence thesis, as rendered 
by Idowu, could be conveniently subsumed within the larger framework of the denial 
of the humanity of the negroid race by some prominent Western philosophers and 
social scientists. For example, the English empiricist, David Hume, disparagingly 
views the Negroid race thus: 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all the other species of 
men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior 
to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other 
complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in 
action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers amongst them, no 
arts, no sciences … There are Negroe slaves disposed all over Europe, 
of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; tho’low 
people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish 
themselves in every profession. In Jamaica indeed th y alk of one 
Negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for 
very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words 
plainly (Hume 1854, 228-229; cited in Idowu 2005, 82). 
 
To fully support Hume’s claim of the inhumanity and unproductivity of the Negroid 
race, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel also argues that Africa is a dark continent 
without history and devoid of any contribution to the development of what he calls 
absolute spirit in world history (Hegel 1824a; 1824b). Immanuel Kant, who preceded 
Hegel, had earlier stated that the original human species was white (Kant cited in 
Makumba 2007, 37), a view that supports the racial superiority of the Caucasian race. 
The foregoing forms the basis of what has been regard d as the logic of “I” 
superiority (see Badru 2008, 238-240)  with which the colonialists’ “ self” interacted 
with the Africans’ “other” as something inferior, even in the area of jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, this colonial legal positivism has been dominant in Africa since then. 
Why then does the present work set out to critically dialogue with the spirit of 
empiricism and positivism in the legal reasoning within the framework of the justice 
system of the post-colonial African state? 
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IV. The Deficit of the Empiricist-Positivist Legal Reasoning in the 
System of Legal Justice of the Post-Colonial African State 
As noted earlier, the colonial legacy of the system of legal justice in post-colonial 
Africa lays emphasis on a specific form of legal reasoning which is highly empiricist-
positivist. This legal reasoning stipulates that in law, a legal pronouncement is only 
validly made on any criminal case between X and Y, for instance, when at least two 
principles are followed: (i) there must be a physically demonstrable causal connection 
between the harm suffered by the victim and the action or series of actions of the 
offender, or a clearly demonstrable connection betwe n an offence committed and a 
suspected offender (the empiricist aspect); (ii) the law or legal rule to be applied must 
be clearly set out in a known document and laid out by a known sovereign. In 
contemporary African societies, this sovereign is regarded as a constitutionally 
constituted authority (such as the legislature), charged with the responsibility of law-
making, or any other relevant authority to which the power of making legally binding 
rules and regulations has been delegated by the former authority, or the 
pronouncements of judges in celebrated cases decided in the past (stare decisis), 
among others (the positivist aspect). Within this context, legal reasoning is regarded 
as valid if the criteria are fully satisfied, and invalid if the two principles are infracted, 
either partially or wholly. These two principles of the Western mode of legal 
reasoning also manifest in the system of legal justice of other regions of the world 
affected and largely influenced by past Western colonisation. 
 
In terms of merit, one cannot deny that the afore-stated empiricist-positivist legal 
reasoning flows from a demonstrable, laid down procedure that cannot be easily 
abused by any biased party. Another of its merits is that the law or legal rule that 
supports the legal reasoning is easily attributable to a given authority or regime, which 
could as well be legally questioned (and sanctioned) should it also run foul of the law 
or legal rule. It should be noted that these merits are highly theoretical in the sense 
that the base, the positive law they arise from, could still be abused in practice by a 
clever re-interpretation from a witty legal counsel in the process of marshalling a 
strong defense for his/her client(s). Once this is successfully done, the empiricist-
positivist legal reasoning itself assumes a partial undertone. For example, a defense 
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counsel could argue eloquently and cleverly, re-intrpreting a positive legal rule in 
order to ensure that his/her client, though factually guilty, is ultimately acquitted (one 
could call this a false acquittal). 
 
However, the empiricist-positivist legal reasoning is fallaciously reductionist: it 
ascribes existential significance only to empirical realities, thereby excluding the non-
physical from the realm of existence. In other words, it does not support the belief that 
extra-sensible or trans-empirical realities have any o tological status as well as 
empirically demonstrable epistemological access. To this extent, such realities are 
devoid of any significance in the system of legal justice. On this empiricist-positivist 
framework, truth-finding, which is fundamental to accurate dispensation of legal 
justice, should be restricted to the realm of the pysical. Therefore, strictly speaking, 
it is in tension with the belief in the duality of reality within African cosmology and 
ontology - the belief that reality is composed of the physical and the non-physical. 
This belief is very important in truth-seeking in the endeavour to ensure an accurate 
and balanced legal justice system in contemporary Africa. 
 
It is the problem of reductionism that has prevented the dominant positivist legal 
reasoning in Africa from making a connection between the hidden killers of important 
political personalities in Nigeria, for instance, and their political victims. So long as 
the killings are done in a state of high secrecy or through metaphysical means, 
negating any plausible claim of physically demonstrable causal connection between 
the supposed offender and the offended, they attract no legal significance in 
themselves and, thus, no legal punishment to the perpetrators. Consequently, legal 
justice is denied to the victims (if they are still a ive) or to the dependents of the 
victims (if the victims are no longer alive). This graphically explains why the family 
of Chief Bola Ige, the former Attorney- General of Nigeria under the administration 
of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2003), has to datebeen deprived of legal justice. 
The problem is that the dominant empiricist-positivis  legal reasoning in Nigeria has 
largely failed to make a physically demonstrable causal connection between the 
supposed killer(s) (the suspected offender) and the late Chief (the victim). The actual 
killer(s) might have been among the initial suspects, but so long as there is no 
empirically demonstrable way to connect them to the killing, they go unpunished, and 
thus legal justice is miscarried. However, if the African metaphysical epistemology 
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had been duly employed, the true killer(s) might have been identified and legally 
punished. 
 
The problem of non-identification of offenders also explains why many political 
leaders within the contemporary African state, who ave sworn to uphold the 
constitution in order to serve the interests of the people, soon become overly corrupt. 
Many of them even go unpunished. The problem is that once the empiricist-positivist 
legal reasoning fails to establish their guilt because they are adept at hiding their loot 
or clever in going about their corrupt practices, they are left alone. The message being 
passed across seems to be something along the lines: “Corruption in political 
leadership is only wrong when the people involved are not smart enough to evade the 
empiricist-positivist legal scrutiny.” However, if the contemporary African state is 
serious in its endeavour to ensure a balanced and efficient legal system that is capable 
of tracking covert social and political criminalities as well as metaphysically induced 
criminalities, a complementary methodology of truth-finding in the legal system is 
needed. This is where the methodology of African metaphysical epistemology 
becomes imperative. 
 
V. African Metaphysical Epistemology, Truth-Finding and a 
Balanced System of Legal Justice in Post-Colonial Africa 
As philosophers such as Oke (2007), Idowu (2009), Balogun (2007) have argued in 
one way or another, a coherent legal system was not foreign to pre-colonial African 
societies. What seems to be largely absent in theirworks is how African metaphysical 
epistemology could be significant in ensuring accurate and balanced dispensing of 
legal justice in the contemporary African state. For example, Oke (2007) is only 
interested in showing some portion of the Ifa corpus in Yoruba cosmology that could 
be employed to argue against capital punishment. In the first work of Idowu (2006) 
cited, the interest of the author is to critically respond to as well as counter the belief 
that there is absence of African jurisprudence, while the aim of his second work 
(Idowu 2009) is to advance the view that there should be a cultural dimension to the 
understanding of jurisprudence. For Balogun (2007), the focus of interest is on how to 
arrive at an African concept of law. None of these works seems to have any deeply 
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theoretical or practical interest in the exploration of African metaphysical 
epistemology in relation to legal justice in contemporary Africa. 
 
However, a systematic articulation of the relevance of African metaphysical 
epistemology to legal justice in post-colonial Africa constitutes the significance of the 
present study. Although Balogun (2007) refers to something of that nature in passing 
in the latter part of his work, he does not systematically develop and explain how 
African metaphysical epistemology could be properly institutionalised to serve the 
course of legal justice in contemporary Africa: thepr sent article attempts to fill this 
gap. 
 
Being a term of general application, African epistemology encompasses, according to 
Martins (2008, 210), quoting N’Sengha (2005, 39-44), four basic ways of knowing: 
divination, revelation, intuition, and reason which can be separated into the categories 
of supernatural, natural and paranormal. Thus one could simply state that African 
epistemology is a composite of both metaphysical and non-metaphysical modes of 
knowing. Laying emphasis on the metaphysical aspect, though he renders it as being 
constitutive of the whole of African epistemology, Sentiwali (2008, pars. 5 & 8) notes 
the degree of spirituality that has characterized African epistemology. He states that 
African epistemology placed great emphasis on spirituality, that is, an understanding 
of the world through a spiritual source. However, there is some conceptual blurriness 
in Sentiwali (2008) in not clearly distinguishing between African epistemology and 
African metaphysical epistemology. 
 
The present article focuses on African metaphysical epistemology as defined earlier, 
rather than on African epistemology as a whole. For purposes of further clarification, 
one could state that African epistemology is the totality of the modes of knowing 
within the African world, such as elders’ consultation (given that African elders / 
sages are taken to be repositories of wisdom), sense- xperience (given that the elders 
consulted usually rely on their past social experiences as the basis of their epistemic 
capacity), reason (given that the African elders/sage  reflect on social realities), and 
spirituality (the metaphysical aspect of African epistemology), among others. 
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However, African metaphysical epistemology is that part of African theory of 
knowledge that lays emphasis on the spiritual modes of knowing empirically hidden 
facts about the present or the future world. For example, the Ifa oracle in Yoruba 
culture, a metaphysical form of knowing, may be consulted in order to unravel why a 
given person behaves abnormally in an attempt to find a cure for him / her after 
orthodox medical expertise has failed to discover th  source of the ailment as well as 
its cure. In the present context, the epistemic-metaphysical resource of the Ifa oracle, 
for example, could be properly harnessed and formally harmonised with the 
empiricist-positivist thinking in the justice system of Nigeria. Similar traditional 
methods of epistemic value are abundant among other et nic groups in Nigeria that 
could be similarly utilised, and the same is true of many other African societies. 
 
There are different modes of knowing that could be justifiably subsumed within what 
is generally referred to here as African metaphysical epistemology. The wide range of 
manifestations may include the act of using an altered mental state in order to see and 
know about the well being of family members and friends living in distant places, 
which is practiced by the Shaman of the San of South Africa (see Lewis-Williams et. 
al. 2004, 91); the act of peering into a clay pot filled with virgin water in order to 
view and know about activities conducted in distant places, practiced by the elderly of 
the Dagara people (see Malidoma 1994, 25); the consultation with the Ayelala 
priest/priestess, who, deriving information from the Ayelala goddess, identifies and 
exposes the culprit of a covert crime without exerting any physical pressure on 
him/her, among others. A reliable source puts the latt r metaphysical process of truth-
discovery thus: 
In the event of a crime secretly committed, all the suspects are brought 
before the Ayelala shrine to swear one after other, holding a specific 
object in their left hand. After the swearing, the Ayelala priest/priestess 
leaves the suspects for a while to see the outcome of the exercise. If the 
real offender is among those who have sworn, then only the offender 
would compulsorily confess, without being physically forced to do so 
… Or, all the suspects are brought before the shrine a d given omi 
Ayelala to drink and thereafter asked to go home. If the off nder is 
among those who have drunk the Omi Ayelala he would start swelling 
mysteriously and when this becomes unbearable to him, e would 
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compulsorily confess to the crime, without being physically impelled 
to talk.2 
 
In the foregoing process, which is usually conducted in some areas of the south-
western parts of Nigeria, for example, it is apparent that the epistemic exercise of 
truth-discovery has some obvious merit. First, the trickery of the offender may not 
help him/her to hide his/her involvement in the offence, since potent metaphysical 
means are deployed to unravel the true identity of the offender. However, if one were 
to rely on the empiricist-positivist legal reasoning, the offence may not be ascribed to 
a given offender if there is no physically demonstrable causal connection between the 
offence and the suspected person, and the offender may thereby go unpunished. It is 
therefore both theoretically and practically possible for X to commit an offence 
against Y and go unpunished if Y is unable (perhaps out of incompetence, or due to 
the brilliance of the defence counsel of X, or the incompetence/connivance of the 
police in making a proper case) to prove that there is a physically demonstrable causal 
connection between the injury suffered by the latter and the action of the former. 
 
Thus lack of proof may not imply innocence from legal offence, contrary to 
empiricist-positivist legal reasoning. In fact, excssive reliance on lack of proof as 
tantamount to innocence in empiricist-positivist legal reasoning involves the fallacy of 
argumentum ad ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance). The fallacy proceeds from the 
erroneous belief that a statement is true because it has not been proved false, or that it 
is false because it has not been proved true. That a statement has not been proved true 
or false may really have nothing to do with its actu l truth or falsity. Rather, it may 
have to do more with the incompetence of those who ant to prove its truth or falsity. 
 
Similarly, evidence may sometimes be ‘manufactured’ to prove the guilt of an 
otherwise innocent person. Thus even correlation may not prove causation, and this is 
a major weakness of empiricist-positivist legal reasoning. In addition, it could be 
argued that legal pronouncement resulting from empiricist-positivist legal reasoning 
may not actually reflect guilt or innocence. Larry Laudan (2006) affirms this: 
                                               
2 Conversations with the daughter and assistant of the Oba Ayelela of Igode, no 7, Itunlosi Street, 
Igode, Shagamu, Local Government Area, Ogun State, Nigeria, on 15th April, 2010. 
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… one often hears it said … that the accused “is innocent until proven 
guilty” as if the pronouncing of the verdict somehow created the facts 
of the crime. If it were correct that only a guilty verdict or guilty plea 
could render someone guilty, then there could be no false acquittals, 
for it would make no sense to say, as the phrase “false acquittal” 
implies, that a jury acquitted someone who is actually guilty. Since 
such locutions make perfect sense, we must reject the notion that a 
verdict somehow creates guilt and innocence (Laudan 2006, 11; 
emphases in the original). 
 
All these unfavourable possibilities clearly define the limitations of the dominant 
empiricist-positivist legal reasoning in the post-colonial African state. In addition, 
they amply justify the significance of having a reliab e epistemic methodology of 
truth-seeking in the legal theory and practice of any society. If there is no possibility 
of knowing the truth as to whether or not a crime has been committed resulting in 
some harm, the truth of who the actual offender is, the truth of who has been actually 
wronged/ harmed, the possibility of witnessing a miscarriage of legal justice is high. 
 
At this point, one fundamental question still remains: what is the relevance of 
metaphysical epistemology to legal theory and practice in Africa? We must bear in 
mind that if it is to be effective, the legal theory and practice of a society ought to 
recognize and reflect the specificities of that society. This fact constitutes the 
pragmatic significance of the core recommendation of this study. African 
metaphysical epistemology recognizes, addresses and therefore complements the 
limitations of the Western empiricist-positivist legal reasoning in post-colonial 
African societies. 
 
Many Africans subscribe to the belief that the concept of being is admissible with 
regard to both the material and the non-material, and that neither is reducible to the 
other. On the other hand, being an outcrop of the Western metaphysical theory of 
materialism, both legal empiricism and positivism do not subscribe to the noted 
African belief. According to Ekanola, there is sufficient proof that traditionally, many, 
if not all Africans uphold a dualistic conception of reality: they see existence as partly 
physical and partly spiritual, and also believe in their interrelationship (Ekanola 2006, 
75-76). Abimbola (2006) concurs with Ekanola thus: 
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… Yoruba religion divides the cosmos into two realms: the spiritual 
world and the natural world. The spiritual world is the abode of 
spiritual forces, such as Olodumare (the Yoruba High “Deity”), the 
Orisa (all the Yoruba divinities), the Ajogun (anti-gods or the 
malevolent supernatural powers), the Aje (who are translated 
inadequately into English as “witches”) and the ancestors. The natural 
world is composed of humans, animals and plants. Spiritual beings 
visit the natural world regularly, and through divination, sacrifice and 
spirit possession, natural beings can also partake in the spiritual world 
occasionally. The spiritual and natural worlds are, therefore, 
interdependent (Abimbola 2006, 52). 
 
As a result of the close relationship between the physical world and the world of spirit 
beings in African cosmology and ontology, African metaphysical epistemology holds 
that truth-finding in the administration of legal justice ought to go beyond the physical 
realm. Consequently, it is able to unravel the true id ntities of those involved in 
criminalities that are metaphysically induced, such as the killing of Y by X through 
incantations or other potent metaphysical means, which t e empiricist-positivist legal 
reasoning would find too difficult, or even totally impossible, to unearth. It is also 
effective in unravelling the true identities of those involved in various criminalities 
that are usually conducted in high secrecy, such as t e killing of political personalities 
rampant in post-colonial African societies. In fact, African metaphysical epistemology 
has been found to be effective by the genuine practitioners of it, wherever they are 
located in Africa, as well as by those who patronize their services. Consequently, we 
propose that African metaphysical epistemology be recognised in the constitutions of 
the various African countries within the framework f legal justice. 
 
To negate our first position above about truth-discovery involving metaphysically 
induced criminalities, it could be argued that the position could easily be dismissed by 
the contemporary, science-oriented mind. However, w have three counter-theses to 
this sceptist-scientist objection, namely, logical inconsistency, epistemic 
incompetence and epistemic injustice. 
 
First, the view of the sceptist-scientist is inconsequential here because he/she is 
mainly familiar  with and concerned about the empirical realm. As such, his/her 
epistemic claims are only worthy of serious consideration if they are statements with 
empirical contents, within empirical contexts. Here, we explicitly acknowledge that 
30 Ronald Olufemi Badru and Tayo Raymond Eegunlusi 
 
some statements may have empirical contents within empirical contexts. For example, 
X killed Y (the empirical context of killing) and Zsays that he/she saw X do it (the 
statement with empirical content about the empirical context), and Z is generally a 
trustworthy moral agent. However, some other statements may have trans-empirical 
contents within empirical contexts. For example, Z killed Y (the empirical context of 
killing), and Z unambiguously confesses that he/she did it through metaphysical 
means (the statement with trans-empirical content about the empirical context), and Z 
was tested and found to be mentally composed when he/she committed the murder, 
and still so when he/she makes the confession. Now, if one were to draw on the 
foregoing, one could rightly state that if the sceptist-scientist is to be logically 
consistent, he/she should not meddle with what is trans-empirical because to do so 
would be tantamount to being logically inconsistent. 
 
Second, apart from being logically inconsistent, if the sceptist-scientist were to 
meddle with what is trans-empirical, he/she could also be accused of going beyond 
what his/her epistemic orientation could possibly support. As such, we would not be 
obligated to accept his/her claims about trans-empirical reality because he/she is 
epistemically incompetent as far as such reality is concerned. 
 
Third, one could also reasonably argue that denying any relevance to African 
metaphysical epistemologists in the present context, without first subjecting them to 
critical evaluation in this regard, is tantamount to committing an epistemic injustice 
against them ab initio. An epistemic injustice is committed against any rational person 
if the value of truth is uncritically or prejudicially denied of his/her claims to 
knowledge ab initio, or if the property of falsity is uncritically or prejudicially 
ascribed to his/her claims to knowledge ab initio (see, for example, Fricker 2007). 
Reflectively, one could state that the principle of epistemic justice requires, among 
others, that (i) rational claims to knowledge ought not to be uncritically or 
prejudicially dismissed from the outset, and (ii) rational claimers of knowledge ought 
to be given ample opportunity to demonstrate their claims to knowledge. 
 
Even if the three counter-theses above were accepted, an objector could still contend 
that the practitioners of African metaphysical epistemology, by asserting the efficacy 
of their methodology, infract the principle of natural justice that no one ought to sit as 
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judge in his/her own case. However, the principle of natural justice, if it applies here 
to the practitioners of African metaphysical epistemology, is violated in much the 
same way by an empiricist-positivist legal practitioner who claims that his/her 
empiricist-positivist legal reasoning is more effective than any other alternative. As in 
the case of the claim of the practitioners of African metaphysical epistemology, an 
empiricist-positivist legal practitioner is also acting as a judge in his/her own case. 
Thus if the former claim is to be rejected on this account, the latter one also stands 
dismissed on the same account, if we really want to be consistent. 
 
After advancing the counter-theses above, perhaps a way to resolve the contextual 
issue is to argue that we should not solely judge the efficacy of African metaphysical 
epistemology on the basis of the claim of the practitioners, or its inefficacy on the 
basis of the counter-claim by a person of empiricist-positivist orientation. Rather, a 
pragmatic approach is to tentatively embrace African metaphysical epistemology and 
deploy it in legal practice with a view to determining its effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness. 
 
How, then, could African metaphysical epistemology be tentatively embraced in the 
legal system of a post-colonial African state? Below we offer three suggestions. 
 
First, associations of practitioners of traditional African epistemology within the post-
colonial African state should identify from among themselves those that are tried-and-
true and commend them to the judicial arm of governme t. 
 
Second, the judicial arm of government should absorb those te ted hands from among 
traditional African metaphysical epistemologists and equip them with requisite skills 
to enable them to fit into the established system of legal justice. A special body should 
be created within the judiciary to be responsible for the training and effective 
operations, as well as for the welfare of those practitioners so absorbed. However, an 
objector could raise the challenge of reconciling the work of Western-trained legal 
professionals whose orientation is empiricist-positivi t with the task of training these 
traditional African specialists. Nevertheless, this challenge can be successfully 
confronted: the people with an empiricist-positivist orientation claim that they deal 
with hard facts, so to speak. Thus if they were to be consistent, they could not 
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possibly deny the hard fact of the general epistemic inability of their orientation to 
access and understand extra-sensible or trans-empirical reality, or the efficacy of the 
services of the practitioners of African metaphysical epistemology as well as the 
causal relationship between the material and the non-material worlds. This obvious 
orientation deficit can be corrected if those who subscribe to the empiricist-positivist 
orientation are truly interested in advancing their epistemic frontiers. Nevertheless, 
they could only address this deficit by embracing the proposed African metaphysical 
epistemology. 
 
Thus one could aver that African metaphysical epistmology complements, rather 
than undermines, the epistemic capacity of the Western empiricist-positivist 
orientation. In fact, the point of the alleged undermining of the empiricist-positivist 
orientation through the African metaphysical epistemology does not arise at all, given 
that the term ‘undermining’ essentially means watering down something, that is, 
making it less powerful. An official adoption of the African metaphysical 
epistemology to complement the empiricist-positivis orientation in the justice system 
in Africa strengthens the efficacy of the latter, given that it extends its truth-seeking 
function beyond the material realm. 
 
Although we have so far drawn more on the facts from Nigeria to support our 
position, this does not mean that there are no facts from other countries in Africa to 
further bolster our argument. In Kenya, for example, the Njuri Ncheke Council, 
among the Ameru Community, which initially operated as the traditional judicial 
system on the basis of wisdom, discipline, knowledge and experience of the Ameru 
history and culture, still occupies a crucial niche among the Community, especially 
with regard to peace-building through conflict resoluti n and reconciliation (see 
Kamwaria et. al. 2015, 44). 
 
Third, since the legislative institution of the contemporary African state is composed 
of elected representatives of the people, it should make a law to support the laudable 
project of incorporating African metaphysical epistemology into the legal system. 
 
In our view, if all the foregoing and other requisite measures were taken, there would 
be a balanced and effective legal justice system that would reflect the peculiarities of 
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African societies, thereby  highlighting the relevance of specific aspects of our 
traditional practices to the development of the justice system in post-colonial Africa. 
 
However, there are some criticisms that might be raised against the proposal of the 
present work. It might be argued that if empirical-positivist legal reasoning is to be 
rejected in the establishment of criminal wrongdoing, it must be rejected as a mode of 
reasoning altogether, and would therefore have to be replaced (it could not simply be 
complemented, because they are incompatible) by a met physical epistemology in all 
areas of reasoning, including science, technology, business practice and everything 
else.3 This counter-argument fundamentally errs in the sense that a total rejection of 
empirical-positivist reasoning in the legal system is not canvassed by the present 
study, given its own merit mentioned earlier; the article only proposes that the 
empiricist-positivist reasoning be complemented by African metaphysical 
epistemology. There is nothing in the present experience in Africa (except, perhaps, 
the imposed Western ideological hypocrisy that strictly dichotomizes the empirical 
and the non-empirical) that strongly indicates that t e two modes of reasoning could 
not be complementary if properly harmonised in practice,  even though they are 
incompatible in theory from a Western perspective. N vertheless, we are not really 
concerned with the Western perspective here; instead, we are submitting a proposal 
from an African perspective. 
 
Furthermore, an objector might assert that the knowledge offered by African 
metaphysical epistemology is a kind of privileged (restricted) knowledge: it is not 
open to verification by all, that is, it is not something objective or even inter-
subjective,4 and this obvious weakness of the present proposal is popularly taken to be 
the strength of the empiricist-positivist procedure. Under close scrutiny, however, it 
becomes clear that this criticism also applies to the empiricist-positivist procedure. 
Strictly speaking, with regard to objectivity, we could only reasonably claim a 
relative, but not absolute, strength for the empiricist-positivist procedure for truth-
finding in legal justice. The fact is that there is nothing given to the human person, not 
even sense-experience (the foundation of the empiricist-positivist procedure), that 
                                               
3 This point was specifically raised by one of the earli r reviewers of this work. 
4 This was also noted by yet another reviewer of the work whom we thank for this 
important point. 
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could provide such an absolute knowledge that is objectively open to all in an 
identical way. The point is that any empirical evidence that is tendered in a court of 
law does not speak for itself. Actually, legal minds look at it, interpret it, and speak 
from or through the interpretation of it, and this is where the problem of objectivity 
emerges. In a court of law, the prosecution and the def nce counsels may see the same 
empirical evidence and, nonetheless, make different inferences from their perceptions. 
If the empirical evidence were such objectively open to them in a similar way, these 
different interpretations would not arise. 
 
The famous Shakespearean play, The Merchant of Venice, amply demonstrates a 
version of the problem of objectivity in the empiric st-positivist legal reasoning. In the 
work, there was only one bond that specified ‘a pound of flesh,’ which Shylock, the 
Jewish merchant, was to cut off Antonio, should the latter fail to pay at the appointed 
time the money earlier borrowed from the former, on account of Bassanio. The bond 
was duly signed by Shylock and Antonio. When Antonio failed to repay Shylock at 
the appointed time, Shylock demanded for nothing else xcept what was specifically 
worded in the bond. When the case was brought to a c urt of law, the said bond was 
read and strictly interpreted in a way by Portia, a lawyer, to save the life of Antonio, 
while Shylock also strictly interpreted it in another way to legally support and carry 
out his sinister motive of killing Antonio in the process of cutting off a pound of flesh. 
Some critics might be quick to state that this is simply fiction; but it is fiction that 
depicts what actually obtains in empiricist-positivist legal reasoning. 
 
We do not suggest in any way that our proposal is infall ble: actually, nothing in the 
world of the human person is. The modest claim thatwe are making is simply that 
there may be some hidden facts that are highly significa t to the task of correctly 
determining a legal case in the post-colonial African state, but which the dominant 
empiricist-positivist procedure may be unable to unearth because of its undue 
emphasis on physicalism. In the absence of such facts, there may be a miscarriage of 
legal justice. Consequently, we propose the methodology of African metaphysical 
epistemology, which is suited to addressing the problem of inaccessibility of those 
facts whose nature places them beyond the reach of the empiricist-positivist 
framework. 
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To further bolster our proposal for the adoption of the methodology of African 
metaphysical epistemology to complement the dominant empiricist-positivist legal 
reasoning in post-colonial Africa, there are at least three other significant arguments 
that could be advanced, as presented below. 
 
(a) Argument from the Promotion of Authentic African Culture in 
Governance 
In the present age of Western cultural globalisation, we should also be concerned with 
the glocalisation of African values and traditions, that is, the conscientious projection 
of these values and traditions to the global level by showing forth their relevance to 
governance in contemporary African societies. By constitutionally approving the 
African metaphysical epistemology in the administration of legal justice in Africa, we 
would be show-casing its relevance to the rest of the world: we would be showing the 
world that the African metaphysical epistemology has something of pragmatic 
significance to governance on the Continent. 
 
(b) Argument from the Moral Value of Official Recognition of the 
African Metaphysical Epistemologists   
It could also be reasonably argued that showing the pragmatic relevance of the 
African metaphysical epistemology to the promotion of an effective and balanced 
system of legal justice in Africa is giving official recognition to its practitioners as 
significant participants in the building of a stable and vibrant socio-political order on 
the Continent. We know that African metaphysical epistemologists already function at 
the traditional level of governance (for example, they are sometimes consulted by 
king-makers in the choice of kings). The argument here is that they should also be 
involved in the administration of legal justice within the post-colonial democratic 
setting in Africa. The moral value of this recognition cannot be over-emphasized, 
given that recognition necessarily implies a basic ttribution of human dignity to the 
other subject (see Piromalli 2015, 208). 
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(c) Argument from Citizenship Theory 
Citizenship theory forms one of the normative foundations of public service ethics. Its 
central claim is that a public official ought to act in his/her official capacity as a good 
citizen; and acting as a good citizen entails conducting official business in a way that 
shows deep commitment to being responsive to fellow citizens - encouraging their 
participation (in administration), being accountable to them, viewing them as the 
locus of  ultimate administrative loyalty, respecting the dignity of the individual, 
fostering deep deliberation, and encouraging civic virtue and concern for the common 
good (see Cooper 2004, 396-397; The Secretariat 1997, 4; Pevkur 2009, Par.16). 
 
Drawing from the citizenship theory of public ethics, it is evident that embracing the 
services of African metaphysical epistemologists in the administration of legal justice 
in post-colonial African states achieves at least two objectives: (1) it serves to 
encourage the practitioners’ active participation in the democratic governance of the 
state, and (2) it presents the leadership of the stat as evincing good citizenship. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
In this article, we have made a systematic attempt to critically examine the colonial 
legacy of empiricist-positivist legal reasoning in the legal theory and practice within 
the post-colonial African state. Central to our argument is the view that this 
empiricist-positivist legal reasoning has largely failed to fully dialogue with the 
holistic understanding of reality within the purview of African cosmology and 
ontology, since it only approaches reality from the physicalist perspective. The article 
argues further that this outlook finds it difficult, if not totally impossible, to address 
metaphysically induced criminalities as well as criminalities perpetrated in high 
secrecy in contemporary African societies. Lastly, the article recommends the 
institutionalisation of African metaphysical epistemology within the framework of 
post-colonial system of legal justice in Africa. This proposal is based on the fact that 
African metaphysical epistemology accords with the cosmology and ontology of 
sizeable portions of African populations. It recognizes and addresses the limitations 
and, therefore, complements the Western empiricist-po itivist legal reasoning in post-
colonial Africa, just as the latter complements theformer because of the latter’s 
relative strength in the area of objectivity. Consequ ntly, if this proposal could be 
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accepted and conscientiously implemented, there would be a balanced and effective 
legal justice system in post-colonial Africa. 
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